The question of what impact mergers and acquisitions have on key equilibrium performance measures is fundamental to our understanding of competitive dynamics in an oligopolistic industry. We address these questions in the context of price competition models with differentiated goods and asymmetric firms allowing for general non-linear demand and cost functions merely assuming that both the pre-and post-merger competition games are supermodular along with two minor technical conditions. We show that, in the absence of cost synergies, post-merger equilibrium prices exceed their pre-merger levels. Moreover, the post-merger equilibrium profit of the merged firms exceeds the aggregate of the pre-merger equilibrium profits of the merging firms. The equilibrium profit of the non-merging firms increases as well. We establish our results, at first, for settings where each firm in the industry offers a single product; we then generalize them to industries with multi-product firms. We also derive conditions under which cost synergies, by themselves, result in lower equilibrium prices than otherwise obvserve post-merger, and discuss how the combined effect of increased market concentration and cost synergies can be assessed efficiently.
Introduction and Summary
The question of what impact mergers and acquisitions have on key equilibrium performance measures is fundamental to our understanding of competitive dynamics in an oligopolistic industry. These include the aggregate profits of the merging firms, those of the other firms in the industry (hereafter referred to as the "remaining firms"), equilibrium prices, and consumer welfare.
Early strategy works, for example Steiner (1975) , postulate that mergers should increase aggregate profits of the merging firms, even in the absence of any cost efficiencies resulting from economies of scope or scale. It was also conjectured that horizontal mergers should result in an increase in equilibrium prices, for all of the products offered by the industry. This was assumed, for example, in the classical paper by Williamson (1968) . However, early attempts to substantiate these conjectures on the basis of industrial organization models failed. For example, Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982) , Salant et al. (1983) , and Davidson and Deneckere (1984) all concluded from their analyses that aggregate profits of merging firms actually decline, unless accompanied with significant cost efficiencies due to synergies or economies of scope. At first sight, this appears counterintuitive, since the merged firm always has the option to maintain the (quantity) decisions pertaining to the pre-merger equilibrium and improve on these to achieve higher aggregate profits. However, the dynamics in the competition models analyzed by the above authors are such that the new post-merger equilibrium is associated with lower aggregate profits.
A seminal step toward resolving this enigma was provided by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) . These authors explained that the counterintuitive findings in the prior literature were the result of analyzing the question in the context of Cournot competition models, in which firms select sales quantities or targets as opposed to prices. Davidson and Deneckere proceeded to show that, under price (Bertrand) competition, the anticipated effects can be demonstrated: In the absence of cost efficiencies resulting from a merger, aggregate profits of the merging firms increase as do equilibrium prices. Even the equilibrium profits of the remaining firms increase, while the consumer ends up holding the bag, i.e., consumer welfare declines. Their analysis is based on a model with completely symmetric firms and Pricing Pressure (UPP) measure can, or should, be used as a proxy for the actual changes in equilibrium prices.
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Literature Review
Few topics in industrial organization economic theory have been driven as intensively by policy, legislave, and legal debates and innovation as the impact pf mergers and acquisitions have on market equilibria. As mentioned, Williamson (1968) appears to have been the first contribution to the literature in this area. The author demonstrated, with a simple model, that even if a merger results in price increases, (as he conjectured would often happen,) these may be accompanied with reductions in marginal costs due to synergies. The combined effect on aggregate surplus or welfare may therefore be positive in spite of universal price increases in the industry. As elementary as this observation is in 2011, Williamson's insights directly challenged prior criteria in the U.S. courtss, attempting to apply anti-trust laws such as the Clayton Act. For example, in the 1962 case of Brown Shoe vs. United States, the court refused to entertain the argument that cost efficiencies arising from the merger could result in increased welfare. In 1967, the Supreme Court went even further when evaluating Procter and Gamble's acquisition of Clorox. It argued that such cost synergies should actually be viewed as an additional argument against the merger, in as much as they result in additional profit and cash flow enhancements for the merged enterprise. Prior to the eighties, the strategy literature posited that aggregate profits of merging firms should increase even in the absence of any cost synergies, see e.g., Steiner (1975) chapters 2 and 3. As mentioned in the Introduction, the first attempts to establish this result in a formal oligopoly model are due to Salant et al. (1983) , Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982) , and Davidson and Deneckere (1984) . However, these papers found that aggregate profits of merging firms may, in fact, decline. All three papers analyzed mergers in the context of Cournot competition for a homogeneous good. Perry and Porter (1985) countered that the enigmatic outcome in, for example, Salant et al. (1983) , is due to the authors ignoring cost synergies resulting from a merger in their homogeneous Cournot model. These authors show that the aggregate profits of merging firms are guaranteed to increase, if the cost synergies are sufficiently large.
Continuing to address Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous goods, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) expanded the discussion to the impact mergers have on the equilibrium price. (In a model with homogeneous goods, all products are sold for the same price.) Farrell and Shapiro show that the equilibrium price increases under linear cost structures and in the absence of cost synergies. These authors also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a price increase under certain classes of non-linear cost functions and possible cost synergies 2 . Deneckere and Davidson (1985) made a seminal contribution to the discussion, showing that all of the anticipated effects can be guaranteed in specific classes of (Bertrand-) price competition models with differentiated goods: in the absence of cost synergies, equilibrium prices are guaranteed to increase, the equilibrium profits of a merged enterprise exceed the aggregate of the pre-merger profits of the merging firms while the equilibrium profits of all other firms increase as well. The authors established these results in a symmetric model with linear demand and cost functions. (As mentioned in our Introduction, in their appendix, the authors extend these results to non-linear demand functions, under five conditions, the most important of which is that the industry is symmetrically differentiated, see ibid.)
Thereafter, a few contributions have been made to generalize the Deneckere and Davidson (1985) results to models allowing for asymmetry among the firms or general non-linear demand functions. Zhao and Howe (2010) generalize the Deneckere and Davidson results to models with linear demand and cost functions such that in each product's demand function the coefficient in front of the product's own price is product specific but a single uniform coefficient applies to all cross terms in all demand functions.
Many oligopoly models employ affine demand and cost functions because of the ensuing analyticl symplifications. Example include Singh and Vives (1984) and Hackner (2000) in the economics literature and Farahat and Perakis (2007) , ?, Adida and DeMiguel (2011) and Perakis and Sien in operations management. The affine structure is clearly restrictive; indeed Jaffe and Weyl recently established that with more than two firms, no descrete choice model can generate linear demand functions. Farshal and Perakis showed that the linear structure involves other difficulties in the multi-product modes, these authors develope a "non-negative restriction" of affine demand functions and, among other contributions, Davidson and Deneckere results for this variant of the affine structure, see Proposition 5 ??? 1. Werden and Froeb (1994) established the Deneckere and Davidson ?? ? results for a model with multinomial logit demands and linear costs; these authors applied the model to the U.S. market of long-distance carriers, calculating the impact of various potential mergers. Levy and Reitzes (1992) established the above results in a model where all consumers and all n firms are located on a circle: each consumer patronizes the firm whose full price, consisting of a direct price plus a travel cost proportional to the distance to the firm, is lowest. As mentioned in the Introduction, the influential survey chapters by Whinston (2006 Whinston ( , 2007 conjecture that the results in Deneckere and Davidson should apply to general supermodular price competition models, a conjecture our paper confirms the above mentioned two additional conditions.
As discussed, merger analysis has become a standard tool to evaluate the impact of potential mergers, a trend stimulated by the development of effective structural econometric methods for oligopoly models. Here, the demand and cost functions in a price competition model are estimated. Thereafter, a counterfactual study is undertaken to estimate the price-, market share-and profit implications of a potential merger. Examples include Werden and Froeb (1994) for the market for long distance carriers, Nevo (2000) for the ready-to-eat cereal industry, Dube (2005) for the soft drink industry and Thomadsen (2005) for the fast-food drive thru industry in Santa Clara County. See Berry and Pakes (1993) for a general discussion of the use of the above econometric methods to enable merger simulations and Baker and Bresnahan (1985) for an early application based on more elementary estimation methods.
All of these merger simulation studies expect and confirm the above mentioned phenomena in terms of increases in equilibrium prices and profits. We refer the reader to section 5 for a review of the literature discussing alternatives to merger simulation, as tools to approximate the impact of mergers and acquisitions.
The Model
We initially consider an industry with N firms, each offering a single product to the market. (In subsection 4.3 we generalize our results to industries with general multi-product firms.) The expected demand volumes for these products depend on all product prices according to a general system of demand equations. Each firm selects its price level from a given, closed, price interval. The cost incurred by each firm depends on its sales volume according to a given, possibly nonlinear, cost function. We characterize the impact of a merger of several of the firms, without loss of generality the first I firms, with 2 ≤ I ≤ N . Thus, for each firm i, i = 1, . . . , N , let pi = the price selected;
Ci(di) = the total cost incurred by firm i, specified as a differentiable function of its sales volume.
We use the common notation, p−i, to denote the (N-1)-dimensional vector of prices pertaining to all but firm i's prices. Similarly, we denote by p−I , the (N-I)-dimensional price vector (pI+1, ...pN ).
We consider fully general differentiable demand functions, merely assuming, without loss of generality, that:
i.e., each product's demand function is downward sloping in its own price and nondecreasing in any of the competing products' prices. As to the price bounds, {p } we assume that they are set loosely enough as to be non-binding whenever a firm determines the best response to a given set of choices by the competitors. We impose these bounds merely to ensure that the feasible price range for each product is a compact set.
The expected profit function of each firm when operating by itself, is thus given by
In this section, we assume that when the first I firms merge, this merger does not result in any cost savings, i.e., the I products continue to be procured in the pre-merger way, so that the cost function of the merged firm is given by
The post-merger profit function for the merged firm is thus given by
We assume that the profit functions exhibit the following two properties:
(Q) (Quasi-Concavity) Each firm i's profit function πi(p) is strictly quasi-concave in its own price variable pi, i = 1, . . . , N .
(S) (Strategic Complementarity) (i) For all i = 1, . . . , N the profit function πi(pi, p−i) is supermodular in every price pair (pi, pj) with j = i.
(ii) The profit function of the merged firm π m (p1, . . . , pN ) is supermodular in each price pair (pi, pj) with i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , N , and i = j.
Condition (S) has been used, with regularity, in the literature. See, for example, Cabral and Villas-Boas (2005) . Vives (1985 Vives ( , 1990 identified broad sufficient conditions in terms of the demand functions and cost structures which guarantee that conditions (Q) and (S.i) are satisfied simultaneously: Assume, the demand functions are twice differentiable and that, for example, each firm has an increasing and convex cost function Ci(.), di(p) is log-concave while
, di is log-supermodular in every price pair (pi, pj) with j = i. (See remark 2 on p. 156 of Vives (2001) .)
It is harder to identify sufficient conditions for property (S.ii), i.e., for the supermodularity of the profit function of a merged firm in terms of simple structural properties of the individual products' cost and demand functions. However, condition (S.ii) is easily verified directly. This applies, in particular, when the profit functions are twice differentiable, in which case (S.ii) is equivalent to
As shown in Section 4.1, one special, but frequently applied, case in which conditions (Q) and (S) can be guaranteed upfront is when all demand and cost functions are affine.
Pre-and Post-Merger Comparison
In this section, we describe our main results. In particular we show that in the absence of cost synergies, both the component-wise smallest and largest post-merger price equilibria are larger than their pre-merger counterparts. This implies that consumer welfare declines due to the merger. In addition, all firms' equilibrium profits increase, with the understanding that we compare the profits of the newly merged firm with the aggregate of their pre-merger profits. We distinguish between the following two games, describing the competition in the industry before and after the merger: In addition, we define the following set of restricted games for any given vector of prices p
pertaining to the firms not involved in the merger:
These games have the first I firms as independent players, each with his feasible price interval as his action space and a profit function obtained from the profit function in the unrestricted pre-merger game the prices of the remaining firms I + 1, ..., N at the levels in the vector p Proof: (a) All of the considered games have continuous profit functions and action spaces that are lattices, either simple closed intervals or, for the merged firm in the game Γ post , the cube X I l=1 A l . To establish the supermodularity of the various games, it therefore suffices to verify that the players' profit functions have the required supermodularity properties. For the games Γ pre and Γ res (p • −I ) this is immediate from condition (S.i). In the game Γ post , each firm i = I + 1, . . . , N has the same profit function πi as in Γ pre and this profit function is supermodular in (pi, pj) for all j = i. Finally, in the game Γ post , the merged firm m has profit function π m which is supermodular in (pi, pj) for all i = 1, . . . , I and all j = 1, . . . , N with j = i by condition (S.ii). Since the games are supermodular, it follows that they have a component-wise smallest and a component-wise largest equilibrium, see e.g., Theorem 4.2.1 in Topkis (1998) . (b) This result follows from the strict quasi-concavity of each profit function πi in its own-price variable pi, i = 1, . . . , N , see condition (Q). (c) Part (c) follows from Lemma 4.2.2 (c) in Topkis (1998) and the supermodularity of Γ post by part (a).
As is well known, one of the implications of a game being supermodular is that its component-wise smallest equilibrium can be computed by a simple tatônnement scheme which starts with the vector p min , the componentwise smallest element of the feasible price space 3 . In such tatônnement schemes, the players iteratively determine best responses to choices made by their competitors in earlier iterations of the scheme. There is considerable flexibility in terms of the sequence in which best response updates are made. Topkis (1998) and Vives (2001) focus on the so-called simultaneous optimization and Round-Robin versions. In the former, all players determine (simultaneously) in each iteration, their best responses to the choices made in the prior iteration with a specific rule determining which best response is selected when the best response fails to be unique. In the Round-Robin version, one chooses a particular permutation of the players; following this permutation, each player is sequentially offered the opportunity to adopt his best response to the most recent choices made by all competitors.
Our first main result is to show that the component-wise smallest and largest equilibrium in the post-merger game are (component-wise) larger than the corresponding equilibria in the pre-merger game. Our proof is based on identifying pairs of specific tatônnement schemes one of which pertains to the post-merger game and one to the pre-merger game, such that in each iteration the price vector determined in the post-merger tatônnement scheme dominates that obtained in the pre-merger scheme, while the pre-merger scheme converges to a specific equilibrium in the pre-merger game, and the post-merger scheme converges to its counterpart in the post-merger game. This proof technique is reminiscent of that employed in Allon and Federgruen (2007) .
To show that p * (post) ≥ p * (pre) andp * (post) ≥p * (pre), we use the following pairs of schemes, respectively:
• Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme
) the smallest equilibrium of the game Γ res (p
); k = k+1 and repeat Step 1.
• Post-Merger Increasing Scheme
• Pre-Merger Decreasing Scheme
) the largest equilibrium of the game Γ res (p
); k := k+1 and repeat Step 1.
• Post-Merger Decreasing Scheme
3 The same property applies to the component-wise largest equilibrium, starting the tatônnement scheme at the largest feasible price vector p max .
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-For i = I+1,I+2,...,N, setq
Proof: (a) We first show, by induction, that the sequence
where the inequality follows from the induction assumption and the fact that in a supermodular game the Ψi(·) operator is increasing, for all i, see Lemma 4.2.2 in Topkis (1998) . Moreover, for the merging firms i = 1, . . . , I, the Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme specifies that
where the inequality follows again from the induction assumption, as well as from the fact that the smallest equilibrium in the supermodular, restricted game Γ res (p (6) and (7) together establish that
, thus completing the induction proof for the monotonicity of scheme {p (k) } which is bounded from above by p max and hence converges to a limit vector p * . By the continuity of the profit functions, p * is a fixed point of the joint best response operator in the pre-merger game, i.e., p * is an equilibrium of the game Γ pre . It remains to be shown that p * = p * (pre), the component-wise smallest equilibrium of Γ pre , i.e., p * ≤ p * (pre). To prove this inequality, consider for any precision > 0, the following -approximation of the Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme:
Approximate Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme (APMIS): 
Step 2.
Note that when APMIS executes a batch of consecutive Step 2 iterations, an ( -approximation) of the smallest equilibrium in the restricted game Γ res (·) is being computed, given the most recently updated prices for the firms I + 1, . . . , N . Thus, modulo the -approximation in the stopping criterion of Step 2, each time APMIS reenters Step 1, a new element of the sequence {p (k) } in the Pre-Merger Increasing Scheme is being generated. Thus, the scheme
converges to an -approximation x * ( ) of the limit vector p * of the scheme {p
. Moreover, by the continuity of the profit functions, lim ↓0 x * ( ) = p * . To show that p * ≤ p * (pre), it thus suffices to show that x * ( ) ≤ p * (pre). This inequality follows by comparing the sequence {x (l) } with {y (l) } ∞ l=1 , the scheme generated by the "simultaneous optimization" variant of the tatônnement scheme in the pre-merger game Γ pre , when, like {x (l) }, starting at the smallest feasible price vector p min . As mentioned in the proof of part (a), since all profit functions in the pre-merger game are continuous and the firm's feasible action sets compact, it follows from Theorem 4.3.4 in Topkis (1998) 
is the sequence generated by the "simultaneous optimization" variant of the tatônnement scheme, applied to the game Γ post and starting at p min . By Lemma 1(a), the game Γ post is supermodular. Since the payoff functions in this game are continuous and the action sets of all players compact, it follows from Theorem 4.3.4 in Topkis (1998) This condition is entirely innocuous when the cost functions are affine: in this case, we may, without loss of generality select p min ≥ c, the constant marginal cost rate vector. When the cost functions are non-linear, the Marginal Profitability condition (MP) may be somewhat restrictive, but can still be argued to apply in most settings.
Indeed, the following is a frequently used sufficient condition for the Marginal Probability condition (MP):
The (CM) condition has been postulated, for example by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) as well as Cabral and VillasBoas (2005). The former pointed out that under the supermodularity condition (S.i), (CM) reduces to assuming that for all
, p−i) is increasing in competitors' prices, when charging at its minimum price level. (Since πi is supermodular in (pi, pj) for all j = i, it has increasing differences in every such price pair, i.e.,, πi(pi, p j ) − πi(pi, pj) is increasing in pi, for any pair of prices pj < p j . Thus πi(p
Lemma 4.3 Under condition (S.i), (CM) ⇒ (MP).
Proof: By (CM) we have, in every price point p ∈ X N l=1 A l , for all i = j that
In view of (1) this implies that for all i = 1, . . . , N pi ≥ C i (di), with di = di(p) for any feasible price vector p, and, in particular, when the prices of the first I products are selected as best responses.
We now derive our first main result, i.e., we show that both the largest and smallest equilibria in the post-merger game dominate, component-wise, their counterparts in the pre-merger game. 
Proof: We show that p * (post) ≥ p * (pre); the comparison proof for the largest equilibrium in the post-and pre-merger game is entirely analogous. In view of Lemma 4.2, it suffices to show that in each iteration k = 0, 1, . . . , q (k) ≥ p (k) . We prove this by induction. The starting conditions of the two schemes have q (0) = p (0) , so that the statement holds for k=0. Assume it holds after the (k-1)st iteration, i.e.,
is immediate from the supermodularity condition (S.i), see, for example, Lemma 4.2.2c in Topkis (1998) .
It thus remains to be shown that q
for i = 1, . . . , I. Since p min and p max are selected so as not to impact on the best response price choices in either the pre-or post-merger industry, we have that the price vector (q 
. By the marginal profitability condition (MP), we have for all l = 1, . . . , i − 1, i, i + 1, . . . , I that q
By the strict quasi-concavity of the profit functions {πi, i = 1, . . . , I} it follows that
Consider now the restricted game Γ res (q
). This game is supermodular by Lemma 4.1. Let Ψ res (x) denote the I-dimensional joint best response vector of the I competing firms in the game Γ res (q
) to an assumed price vector x = (x1, . . . , xI ):
In addition, for all n = 1,2,... let Ψ res(n) (·) denote the n-fold application of the best response operator Ψ res . (10) implies that Ψ res (q
) is supermodular, it follows that the best response operator Ψ res (·) is monotonically increasing. Hence,
It follows that the monotonically decreasing and bounded sequence {Ψ res(n) (q
converges to a limit vector q * , with [p
thus completing the induction proof. The first inequality in (13) follows from the fact that the smallest equilibrium in a supermodular game is a monotonically increasing vector-function of any parameter (string) such that each player's payoff function in the game is continuous and supermodular in the player's action variable and the parameter, see Theorem 4.2.2 in Topkis (1998) . This supermodularity property follows from condition (S.i).
Thus, to complete the verification of the string of inequalities in (13) only the second inequality remains to be substantiated. However, this inequality follows from the fact that q * = limn→∞Ψ res(n) (q
) and hence dominates p * (q
) the component-wise smallest equilibrium of this game. The fact that q * is an equilibrium of this game follows from Theorem 2.10 in Vives (2001) since the game
) is supermodular with continuous payoff functions. We now show that, beyond generating higher equilibrium prices, the merger also results in equilibrium profits for the merged firm that are larger than the aggregate of the pre-merger profits among the I merging firms. Moreover, and perhaps most surprisingly, the remaining (N-I) firms also earn a higher expected profit after the merger. We establish these results under the (CM) condition, (the stronger version of (MP) as shown in Lemma 4.3).
We show that these profit comparison results apply, both to the largest and smallest equilibria in the pre-merger and post-merger games. The comparison results are, in particular, important for the largest equilibrium, since it is well known from Theorem 7 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , that under conditions (S) and (CM) the component-wise largest equilibrium is simultaneously preferred by all firms in the industry. Thus, if multiple equilibria exist, it is most plausible that the largest equilibrium will be adopted.
Define 
Proof: (a) For i = I + 1, . . . , N : Going back to industries which start out with N single product firms, theorem ??? implies that the aggregate profits of a coalition are superadditive in the ??? ??? of the coalition. Thus, assume an industry offering a collection of P N products is partitioned into m coalitions of firms {B1, B2, . . . , Bn} parts by the result of prior merger. Firm j sells lj products, j = 1, . . . , m where N = m j=1 lj. Consider now an additional merger of two of these coalitions, without loss of generality, B1 and B2. Under the conditions of Theorem ???, we obtain the following corollary which generalizes the corollary on page ??? of Deneckere and Davidson (1985) Assuming condition (Qm) ?????????????? let πi(B ??? ) andπi(Bi) denote the aggregate equilibrium profits of firms i = 1, . . . , m in the pre-merger industry, under the component-wise smallest and largest equilibrium, respectively. Finally, let π(B1 B2) andπ(B1 B2) denote the aggregate profits of the firms arising from the merger of firms 1 and 2, again under the componentwise smallest and largest equilibrium, respectively. 
Proof: Immediate from the proof of Theorem 4.8.
Affine Demand and Cost Functions
In this subsection we apply our results to the special case where both the demand and cost functions are affine, but otherwise general, i.e.,
where {ai, bi, βij, ci, ei} are given parameters with bi, βij ≥ 0. As explained in the Introduction, this structure is used in many applications. Without loss of generality, assume each product is priced at or above its marginal cost value, i.e., p min i = ci for all i = 1, . . . , N . It is easily verified that all three of the conditions (Q), (S), and (MC) are satisfied. This implies that both the pre-merger and post-merger games are supermodular. Assume, in addition, that the price sensitivity coefficients satisfy the well known dominant diagonality conditions:
These conditions are very intuitive: (D1) states that a uniform price increase for all firms cannot result in an increase of any product's sales volume; (D2) states that if any product's price is increased, unilaterally, aggregate sales in the industry do not increase. Under the dominant diagonality conditions, we have that both the pre-merger and postmerger games have a unique equilibrium p * (pre) and p * (post), respectively. This follows from the fact that the Jacobian of the system of First Order Conditions is a dominant diagonal matrix, see Vives (2001) and Gabay and Moulin (1980) . The following corollary is therefore immediate from Theorems 4.4 and 4.5.
Corollary 4.7 Consider an industry with affine demand and cost functions (21, 20) . Assume in addition that the dominant diagonality conditions (D1, D2) hold. (a) There exists a unique equilibrium p * (pre) in the pre-merger game, and a unique equilibrium p * (post) in the post-merger game with p * (pre) ≤ p * (post). (b) The equilibrium profits of the merged firm exceed the aggregate equilibrium pre-merger profits of the merging firms. Similarly, the equilibrium profits of all remaining firms increase because of the merger:
Cost Efficiencies Resulting from the Merger
Thus far, we assumed that the merger does not affect the cost structure of the products offered by merging firms. Frequently, mergers result in significant cost synergies. Indeed, such synergies are often the driving force, or one of the principal impetuses, behind a merger. For example, in 2005 Proctor & Gamble announced the largest acquisition in its history, agreeing to buy Gillette in a $57 billion stock deal. The acquisition presented P&G with the opportunity to become the leader in the household and personal care market. The merging firms had reported 2004 profits of $6.5 billion and $1.6 billion, respectively. In the traditional "freeze" period following the merger proposal, AT Kearney was retained to assess the cost synergies. (Such assessments by independent consulting firms are routinely undertaken in any significant merger proposal.) The firm estimated the cost synergies at approximately $1 billion per year; over half the size of the total pre-merger profits of Gillette. While reduced competition results in price increases, see Theorem 4.4, it is generally believed that cost synergies have the opposite effect. In actuality, whether this can be guaranteed or not depends on the specific way the synergies impact on the cost functions of the products being merged. The simplest synergy model assumes that every marginal cost function is shifted by the same constant σ > 0, i.e.,
The pre-merger and post-merger cost functions may be viewed as special cases of a parameterized set of functions Proposition 4.8 Assume the merger induces synergies for the cost structures of products i = 1, . . . , I, as described by (22) . Assume, in addition, that the dominant diagonal condition (D1) applies. These synergies result in price decreases for the smallest and largest post-merger equilibrium compared to their levels in the absence of any cost synergies.
Proof: By Theorem 4.2.2 in Topkis (1998) , it suffices to show that
≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I while for all
Thus, a merger associated with cost synergies described by a uniform marginal cost reduction as in (22), induces two opposite effects. The "increased market concentration", by itself, increases the price equilibrium; however, the cost synergies induce decreases in all equilibrium prices. Which of the two effects dominates, depends on the magnitude of σ.
It should be noted that the price effects described by Proposition 4.7 are specific to a uniform reduction of the marginal cost functions of products 1, . . . , I by the same constant. If the marginal cost reduction is product specific, i.e., C post i (di) = Ci(di) − σidi, or if it fails to be constant, i.e., C post i (di) = Ci(di) − σ(di) for some non-linear function σ(·), it does not appear to be possible to guarantee a reduction of the equilibrium prices as compared to a post-merger equilibrium without such synergies 4 . Returning to the synergy structure (22), focusing on the largest equilibrium, for example, two values of interest are:
pre)}, and
wherep * (post|σ) denotes the largest equilibrium in the post-merger game under a given marginal cost savings σ. In other words, σ + (σ − ) denotes the minimum cost savings such that all (at least one) of the equilibrium prices decreases after the merger. (The second equality in (23) follows from the fact that ifp * (post|σ) ≥p * (pre) for all i = 1, . . . , I, then ranking applies to the prices of the remaining firms, since these are best responses to the prices selected by the merging firms.)
In assessing whether the proposed merger is likely to "lessen competition" one may then evaluate whether the magnitude of σ − (σ + ) is a realistic possibility. (Both σ − and σ + can easily be computed by embedding the tatônnement scheme in a bi-section search for the "break even" value of σ.)
Alternatively, one may assume that the merger results in a marginal cost reduction of one of the products of the merging firms only, and calculate σ + on this basis. This approach was followed, for example, by Nevo (2000) for the ready-to-eat cereal industry. After carefully estimating the demand functions of the different ready-to-eat cereal products, Nevo (2000) simulates various potential pairwise mergers among the six major national competitors. In his Table 5 , the author reports the price increases that result from various potential mergers, assuming that the cost functions remain unaltered. Table 6 proceeds to report what marginal cost reductions for individual products would restore the equilibrium prices to levels at or below the pre-merger values. These "break even" values are then discussed to evaluate whether the net effect of the merger on prices is likely to be positive or negative.
Mergers of multi-product firms
In our base model, we consider a (pre-merger) industry in which each of the products is sold by an independent company. In this subsection we extend our results to the more prevalent case where some or all of the existing firms sell more than one product. (We continue to assume that each product is sold by a single firm.) We characterize the equilibrium consequences of a merger between two of these firms.
Assume there are n firms in the industry, numbered i = 1, . . . , n with firm i offering li ≥ 1 products to the market and N = m i=1 li. We thus use a double index to differentiate among the various products, with product (i, j) referring to the j-th product offered by firm i, i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , li. For firm i, let pi = (pi1, . . . , p il ) denote the firm's price vector and let p denote the N -dimensional vector containing all prices for all N products. The profit function for firm i is thus given by:
Without loss of generality, assume firms 1 and 2 merge to create a new merged firm m with profit function
(As in the base model, we initially assume that the merger leaves all cost functions unaltered.) To ensure that both the pre-merger Γ pre and the post-merger game Γ post are supermodular we need a variant of condition (S):
(Sm): (Strategic Complementarity) (i) For all i = 1, . . . , n, the profit function πi(pi, p−i) is a supermodular function of the vector pi and has increasing differences with respect to p−i.
(ii) The profit function of the merged firm, π m (p1, . . . , pn) is a supermodular function of (p1, p2) and has increasing differences with respect to the remaining prices p −{1,2} = (p3, . . . , pn).
Along with the fact that all n firms in the pre-merger game Γ pre and all n − 1 firms in the post-merger game Γ post have action spaces that are compact lattices, condition (Sm) guarantees that both games are supermodular. Similarly, we need a slight variant of the quasi-convexity condition (Q):
The profit functions πi(p1, p2, . . . , pn) are strictly quasi-concave functions of firm i's price vector pi, i = 1, . . . , n.
As in the base model, we need to consider restricted versions of the pre-merger game in which only firms 1 and 2 are able to vary their price vectors, under given price choices p −{1,2} ≡ (p3, . . . , pn) for the remaining firms. We refer to this restricted duopoly as Γ res (p −{1,2} . In view of the strict quasi-concavity condition (Qm), each firm i = 1, . . . , N has a unique best response Ψi(p−i) to any given choice of prices by the remaining firms. In view of the supermodularity condition (Sm), the merged firm has a component-wise smallest [largest] Step 0:
Step 1:
−{1,2} ), the smallest equilibrium of the restricted duopoly game Γ res (p Post-Merger Increasing Scheme:
Step 0: q (0) := p min , k = 1
Step 1: For i = 1, 2 set (q
2 ) = Ψ m (q A straightforward extension of the proof of Lemma 4.2 establishes that, once again,
It thus suffices to prove that q (k) ≥ p (k) . The proof proceeds, once again, by induction. p min = q (0) ≥ p (0) = p min . Assume, therefore, that q (k−1) ≥ p (k−1) for some k ≥ 1. Since p min and p max are selected so as not to impact on the best response choices in either the pre-or post-merger industry, we have that the price vector (q , ∀j = 1, . . . , l2.
It follows from the (CM) condition and (1) that the second term to the far right of (27) [ (28)] is non-negative so that
2 , q 
We first show that (29), along with conditions (Qm) and (Sm) imply that Ψ1(q , . . . , q
define the relevant market precisely by adding firms and products to the market of interest until the price elasticities of the firms are insensitive to the further addition of new products. As to Farrell and Shapiro (2010a,b) 's argument that UPP measures are easier to evaluate than complete merger simulations, it should be noted that merger simulations may be reduced to implementing, say, the "simultaneous optimization" variant of the tatônnement scheme in the post-merger game, starting from the current (pre-merger) equilibrium price vector, see Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.4. Schmalensee (2009) , while praising Farrell and Shapiro (2010a) for "having made a significant contribution that has the potential to improve merger enforcement," takes issue with their recommendation to use the UPP measure as the indicator by which to rank different merger proposals as the "quantity is unrelated to any measure of customer harm". Instead, Schmalensee (2009) argues for the use of an approximate estimate of post-merger price changes and proposes Price Change Assuming Linearity (PCAL) as an alternative to UPP. PCAL calculates the post-merger equilibrium assuming all cost-functions are linear and all demand functions for the products of the merging firms are linear as well. An additional major assumption is that the demand functions of the products of the merging firms do not depend on the prices of the other firms in the industry, effectively assuming that the merged firm can operate as a monopolist. The results in this paper show that the post-merger equilibrium can be calculated as the limit vector of an increasing sequence of best response price vectors to the pre-merger (observed) equilibrium. To compute this sequence, one needs to postulate a system of demand functions. If the above linear functions -without dependence on prices of non-merging firms -is deemed adequate, this can be used to generate the price change estimates. However, if other specifications (that result in supermodular profit functions) seem more reasonable, these can be evaluated with little effort as well, on the basis of the above simple tatônnement scheme.
